‘The First District Court in Utah has declared a mistrial in the case of a defendant charged with misapplication of corporate funds because the Logan daily newspaper told of another charge (embezzlement) pending against the defendant in the same court roundup story in which the trial was reported.
Furthermore the judge issued a restraining order against the newspaper decreeing that it “shall not print during the course of a trial the facts of additional charges against any defendant…”
Without challenging the judge’s right to act in such matters or lessening the respect we have always had for the courts, the Herald believes this case has implications which ought to be examined lest public rights be jeopardized.
Our concern is not prompted by this case alone, but by a growing trend to cite newspapers into court. The trend may have stemmed from Supreme Court rulings pertaining to alleged prejudicial effects of news coverage in specific cases.
We would not dispute the possibility of prejudicial effects of saturation coverage in highly newsworthy cases in the nation. But in fairly routine cases where news coverage is minimal we see little probability of this. In the Logan case the coverage in question amounted to only a few paragraphs in a column rounding up the week’s business in district court.
The judge had failed to instruct the jury in advance not to read the newspapers – something that is customary in such cases. When he asked them later if they’d seen the embezzlement item in the newspaper, four of them said they had, and he granted a motion by the defense counsel for a mistrial. The Logan editor protested that the judge should have asked, before taking the action, whether the jurors felt they had been prejudiced by the item.
We do not presume to know all the answers or to criticize those charged with carrying out the difficult responsibilities in our judicial system. But we do feel some questions should be pondered seriously for their long-range implications. For example:
– To what extent, if any, should a newspaper be expected to refrain, during a trial, from publishing news of public record that might be related either directly or indirectly to the case? In other words, does hoped-for secrecy from jurors take precedent over the public’s right to know?
– Shouldn’t the judge’s advance instructions not to read news accounts suffice in most cases? And if he fails to give those instructions, shouldn’t jurors that are trusted with the heavy responsibility of determining innocence or guilt be considered competent to make allowances on outside information?
– Isn’t a restraining order as broad as the one at Logan in conflict with the First Amendment, the spirit of the free press, and the public’s right to know?
– Was the Supreme Court interpretation that recognized prejudicial possibilities of news coverage intended to reach out even to a single small news item? Or was it aimed at broad mass coverage situations?
We, like the courts, are deeply interested in justice in its fullest sense. On the subject discussed here, we believe that in the over-all view, the newspaper’s prime responsibility is to the public in general; and that while restraint and good judgment must ever be the goal, papers generally should not be asked to withhold legitimate news during a trial or be penalized for printing true and accurate facts of public record.